Putin and the domestic drivers of Russian foreign policy
An understanding of Russian foreign policy, particularly in the reign of President Vladmir Putin, will remain incomplete without taking into consideration domestic factors. While international factors do play a role, their role has often been overemphasized. This does not merely lead to an incomplete theoretical framework but also significantly affects actual policy.
A general overview of the debate surrounding the role of institutional domestic factors in foreign policy is necessary to understand the theoretical framework in which my argument is situated. Ronald Rogowski posited that domestic institutions significantly affect foreign policy strategies. As the economist Douglass North has argued, states with relatively deficient institutions such as the Ottoman Empire and the Soviet Union survived for as long as they did because economic competition in international sphere is much less fierce compared to the domestic sphere. Rogowski posits three independent variables to evaluate the influence of domestic strategy empirically, namely: — franchise, representation and decision rules. Franchise refers to the exertion and extent of formal influence that a particular group, say, adults, aristocrats or property owners have over the region. Assigning too much weight on a particular group, say, warrior aristocracy may lead to an increase in expansionist policies while suffrage may incline society towards pacifism. Representation refers to the format in which those who make up the franchise are selected. Large constituencies may point to an increasing likelihood of an accommodative approach while small constituencies, especially when homogenous, may lead to favouritism. Decision rules refer to the process by which selected representative(s) steer decisions. In The Federalist Papers, some of America’s founding father argued for a stronger presidency as it will result in a cohesive foreign policy while fragmented power will fail to provide the adequate “bulwark of national security”.
While discussing the influence of domestic factors over Russian foreign policy, one often comes across oversimplification as well as generalization in the literature. This is particularly noticeable in popular western media, which benefits from giving Russia an aura of mysticism. The influence of Aleksandr Dugin, a far-right philosopher with mystic hues, on Putin’s domestic and foreign policy, is often grossly overstated. While ideology does have an impact, it is merely one of the many factors to be considered. Nevertheless, this is understandable given that Kremlin’s policymaking apparatus is secret. References are constantly made to national identity to justify decisions while in reality the decisions are only made to benefit certain groups. President Putin remains the primary decisionmaker. Under President Boris Yeltsin, it was possible for the then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Yevgeny Primakov to formulate the “Primakov doctrine”. Putin’s foreign policies, in contrast, is almost always singularly attributed to him. Russia’s accession to WTO, which remained dormant for the longest time, happened only after Putin’s approval. This is not to say that no other individual plays a role in decision-making. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who enjoys Putin’s confidence considerably, was instrumental on developing policy in Syria. President Medvedev similarly played a crucial role in developing US-Russia Partnership during the Obama years and engaged with the European Union to launch the “partnership for modernization” programme. While external factors such as the Arab Spring, the failure of the American policy did play a role in his decline, it was eventually domestic factors of competing interests and Putin’s unwillingness to cede the centre of power that eventually cemented it. The influence of other individuals on policy extends only so far as they enjoy Putin’s confidence.
A major reason for the failure of the Americans and the European Union’s attempt to engage with Russia lies in their lack of consideration for ideational motives which are inculcated domestically. The EU, being a postmodern entity, sought to include Russia in its larger project of political and human rights. Russia, on the other hand, is a modern entity which saw its partnership with EU on pure economic, transactional terms. President Obama took a similar approach with the reset. The reset managed to achieve many of its short-term objectives. Russia and the US collaborated on the Afghanistan front. Russia banned the sale of S-300 missiles to Iran. Russia’s accession to the WTO also happened in the aftermath of this period. The reset had no impact in transforming Russia’s civil society, transparency or encouraging liberal democracy. As Lo argues, Russia and the US had different reasons for entering into the agreement. Russia felt secure to re-establish its relationship as US was reeling from the global financial meltdown of 2008 and felt threatened by the rise of China. The reset, from Russia’s perspective, marked a recognition of its status as a global power. Obama, on the other hand sought a strategic partnership with the perception of Russia as a helpful regional ally but not a global leader. As Timothy Snyder has argued, Russia’s ambition to be considered a global hegemon has strong historical basis. While Snyder’s work has been subject to some criticism for his conflation of ultra-nationalism with fascism, his limited point on the influence of ethnonationalists deserves to be explored further.
Rogowski has claimed that regimes that are considered to be legitimate are better able to project themselves as global power. In the case of a liberal democracy, legitimacy is established through free and fair election as well as the presence of strong representatives. How does one explain legitimacy in the case of Russia, which is often criticized for its crackdown on civil and political rights? The “Russian Spring” or “Novorossiya” movement can potentially help us identify some answers.
Post the Russian annexation of Crimea, there was mobilization of volunteers and activists on ground in support for President Putin. Such support has usually been association with a phenomenon known as “astroturfing” wherein sponsors operate under façade of grassroots organizing. This has occurred after the invasion of Ukraine on social media as well. Greene and Robertson challenge this conventional narrative. The Kremlin utilized the ideas of ultra-nationalism and imperialist Eurasianism to carve out a distinct idea of the Russian federation incorporating Russian-speaking people across the territories of former USSR states. It was in this context that demonstrations took place in support of the military actions in Crimea incorporating students, veterans, members of political parties etc. This was amplified by state-propaganda television channels. Russia was portrayed as saving civilians and resisting western forces while “returning” Crimea to its place. Supporters of Eurasianism cannot simply be dismissed as agents of the Kremlin. Dugin, one of the most prominent proponents of this ideology, has since expressed his disillusionment with Putin. The movement, nevertheless, did lead to a boast in Putin’s popularity. Putin utilized the proponent of these ideologies to boast his legitimacy and justify his military actions. The invasion of Ukraine was similarly preceded by an essay by Putin questioning the sovereignty of Ukraine and arguing for a common identity of Russians and Ukrainian. This essay essentially espoused the same ideology as that of the Eurasians. Thus, it is hard to ignore the role that domestic ideology envisioning Russia as a hegemon plays in foreign policy considerations.
While Putin can be justifiably blamed for weaponizing a pre-existing ideology, it is also the case that his regime played a crucial role in cementing a consensus. This was constructed utilizing the Kremlin’s hold over media. Putin’s rise to power was followed by the elimination of news channels that did not sing to his tune. As a consequence, the only viewpoint that the majority of Russians had access to was that of Putin’s. As Chomsky has noted, mass media is a potent tool for conveying the perspectives of the elite consensus to the general public in order to subtly manufacture consent. The existence of state-sponsored media plays a crucial role in reinforcing the radicalization of the supporters of the regime. Owing to “motivated reasoning”, people tend to follow media that aligns with their pre-existing worldview. However, the political circumstances and state monopoly in Russia make it hard to access oppositional media. The recent “Sovereign internet” law allows internet surveillance and seeks to create an internet separate from the world.
In conclusion, Russian foreign policy cannot be separated from domestic drivers. While Russia’s institutions can be insular and secretive about the nature of their decision-making, it’s central-apparatus and the role of Putin is well established. The relative stability of the regime in the face of military conflict can be partly attributed to Putin’s ability to create a veneer of legitimacy through the use of media and dormant social consensus to general mass support for his actions. Thus, it is crucial for western powers to be cognizant of Russia’s aspirations and goals while establishing future partnerships.